海德沙龙

Europe: When the Macro Overshadows the Micro 欧洲：当宏观现象掩盖微观动因时 作者：Timothy Taylor @ 2015-8-14

译者：小瑛

校对：沈沉（@你在何地-sxy）

来源：Conversable Economist, http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com.br/2015/08/europe-when-macro-overshadows-micro.html Christian Thimann currently works with the French investment bank AXA while also holding an academic position at the Paris School of Economics. However, from 2008 to 2013 he was Director General and Adviser to the President at the European Central Bank, which makes his views on the economics and politics of the euro crisis especially worth considering.

在巴黎经济学院担任教职的Christian Thimann目前正与法国投资银行安盛合作。他在2008至2013年间曾任欧洲中央银行行长顾问，这个经历使他对欧元危机的相关经济和政治观点变得尤为重要。

He lays out his perspective in "The Microeconomic Dimensions of the Eurozone Crisis and Why European Politics Cannot Solve Them," which appears in the Summer 2015 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives . Like all JEP articles, it is freely available online courtesy of the American Economic Association. (Full disclosure: I've worked as Managing Editor of JEP since the first issue of the journal in 1987.)

他在《经济展望杂志》2015年夏季刊上发表的“欧元区危机的微观视角，及为什么欧洲政治无法解决危机”一文，详细阐述了他的观点。像所有《经济展望杂志》刊登的文章一样，美国经济学会将其免费放到网上供大家阅览。（好吧我承认：我从1987年《经济展望杂志》创刊号开始就担任责任编辑）。

On the economics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the problems have microeconomic roots, not just macroeconomic ones. Here are a couple of intriguing figures. Thimann points out that since the inception of the euro, some economies have consistently run trade surpluses, while others have consistently run trade deficits. This figure shows the cumulative trade surpluses and deficits over time. What's especially interesting to me is the relative steadiness of these lines: countries with trade surpluses tend to add surpluses every year, countries with deficits tend to add deficits every year.

Thimann认为，欧元区经济问题的根源不止在宏观，也有微观层面的根源。以下是一些有趣的图表。Thimann指出，自从欧元诞生开始，某些经济体持续贸易顺差而另一些一直贸易逆差。下图展示了各国历年来的 累计 贸易顺差和逆差。让我特别感兴趣的是这些曲线的相对恒定性：贸易顺差国盈余每年都在增加，而逆差国赤字亦逐年增长。 Thimann argues that a driving factor behind these trade imbalances arises out of the interaction between wages and productivity. If wages in a country are growing a lot faster than productivity, then in effect, the cost of producing in that country is rising and it will be harder for that country to sell in international markets. If two countries share the same currency, so that exchange rate adjustments are not possible, then a country where wages are growing much faster than productivity will be at a competitive disadvantage compared with countries where wage growth is more closely aligned with productivity growth. Thimann points out that in the trade deficit countries, compensation soared well above productivity growth almost as soon as the euro was in place.

Thimann认为，这些贸易不平衡是工资和生产率综合作用的结果。如果一国的工资增长速度高于生产率增速，则该国生产成本将上升，因此其产品在国际市场上的销路不会好。如果两国货币相同，无法使用汇率调节手段，那么工资增长快于生产率增长的国家竞争力就不如工资和生产率增长速度相对一致的国家。Thimann指出，在贸易逆差国，薪酬增长速度高于生产率增长速度的现象几乎是与欧元的启用同时发生的。 Why is Greece not shown among the countries here? Thimann writes in the note under the table: "Greece is not shown in the chart because, while the productivity increase is broadly comparable to that of Portugal, the wage growth was even steeper, rising by 2008 to 180 percent of the 1998 value, hence exceeding the scale of the countries shown; wages have declined by about 20 percent since the crisis to 160 percent."

为何上表中没有希腊？Thimann在表注中解释：“表中没有希腊是因为，如果说希腊的生产率增长还能大体与葡萄牙相比的话，那么其工资增长则过于迅速，从1998年到2008年增长了180%，远高于其他国家，乃至无法在同一张表中展示；从危机开始到现在工资已经下降了20%，至160%”。

Why did wages rise so quickly in the trade deficit countries? Some countries saw real estate bubbles or surges in government borrowing that pushed up wages in a way that productivity growth could not sustain. Public-sector wages took off: "Over the first ten years of the euro, public wages grew by 40 percent in the eurozone as a whole and by 30 percent in Germany. But public sector wages rose by 50 percent in France, 60 percent in Italy, 80 percent in Spain, 110 percent in Greece, and 120 percent in Ireland."

为何贸易逆差国的工资增长如此快？有些国家存在房地产泡沫，或过多依靠政府借贷而非生产力的持续增长推动工资增长。公共领域工资暴涨：“欧元启头十年，整个欧元区公共部门工资的平均增长水平是40%，其中德国为30%。而这一数字在法国，意大利，西班牙，希腊和爱尔兰分别是50%，60%，80%，110%和120%。”

A common justification given for the rapid wage increases was that price levels in many of the trade deficit countries were rising, often at 6-7% per year, and so there was a perceived need for wages to keep up. But for the purposes of international trade and competitiveness, what matters is the wage--not the rise in local-country prices.

通常对工资迅速增长的辩护是，因为贸易逆差国家物价水平增长迅速，多为每年6%-7%，所以名义工资也要相应增加。但在讨论国际贸易和竞争力问题时，关注点是工资，而不是某国物价。

Thimann goes into some detail about how the trade deficit countries in the eurozone also tended to impose rules and regulations leading to higher wages and restrictions on business. My favorite story of the heavy hand of regulation in Greece is one that Megan Green told on her blog back in 2012 , but I've been telling it ever since. It's about finding yourself in a combination bookstore/coffee shop in Athens which, because of regulations, is not allowed at that time to sell books or coffee. Green writes:

Thimann还深入细节描述了一个现象：欧元区内贸易赤字国家更倾向于制定提高工资且限制商业的政策和法规。我最喜欢的关于希腊严苛政策的描述，来自Megan Green 2012年发表的一篇博客文章，我经常提起它。文章描述了作者在雅典一家书吧的经历，由于政府规定，这家书吧当时既不能卖书也不能卖咖啡。Green写到： This is best encapsulated in an anecdote from my visit to Athens. A friend and I met up at a new bookstore and café in the centre of town, which has only been open for a month. The establishment is in the center of an area filled with bars, and the owner decided the neighborhood could use a place for people to convene and talk without having to drink alcohol and listen to loud music.

我在雅典的趣闻能充分说明这一点。我和一个朋友约在市中心一家开业仅一月的书吧见面。这一区周围都是酒吧，店主认为在这里开一间为需要小憩聊天但又不想喝酒精饮料听喧闹音乐的人们服务的店铺是个好主意。

After we sat down, we asked the waitress for a coffee. She thanked us for our order and immediately turned and walked out the front door. My friend explained that the owner of the bookstore/café couldn’t get a license to provide coffee. She had tried to just buy a coffee machine and give the coffee away for free, thinking that lingering patrons would boost book sales.

我们落座后向服务员点了咖啡。她对我们的光顾表示感谢后，立刻转身走出前门。我朋友解释说，店主无法取得出售咖啡的营业执照。她尝试买了一个咖啡机向客人免费提供咖啡，这样吸引客人光顾也能促进图书销售。

However, giving away coffee was illegal as well. Instead, the owner had to strike a deal with a bar across the street, whereby they make the coffee and the waitress spends all day shuttling between the bar and the bookstore/café. My friend also explained to me that books could not be purchased at the bookstore, as it was after 18h and it is illegal to sell books in Greece beyond that hour. I was in a bookstore/café that could neither sell books nor make coffee.

然而，免费提供咖啡也是非法的。店主只能请街对面的酒吧帮忙制作咖啡，而店员要终日往返于书吧和酒吧之间。我朋友还解释说，不能在店里买书，因为18点以后出售图书在希腊是违法的。我光顾的是一家既不能卖书也不能制作咖啡的书吧。 One story like this is a comedy. An economy in which stories like this are commonplace--and which is locked into a free-trade zone with countries sharing a common currency, is a tragedy waiting to happen.

仅仅一则这样的故事还只是趣闻，可是当一个经济体满是此类故事时，灾难随时都可能发生，更何况这个经济体还处于同周边国家共用同一种货币的自由贸易区内。

On the politics of the eurozone, Thimann argues that the euro, the European Central Bank, and all the European-wide negotations over debt overshadowing these other issues. Normally, when a democratic country has miserable economic performance with high unemployment and slow growth, a common response is for its citizens to demand some policy changes from their politicians.

就欧元区的政治，Thimann认为，欧元、欧洲央行和有关债务问题的所有全欧层面的谈判掩盖了其他问题。一般情况下，当一个民主国家经济萧条，失业率高且经济增长缓慢时，民众通常会要求政治家修改政策。

But in the euro-zone, when a country has a miserable economic performance, the politicians of that country tell the citizens that it's not their fault. It's all the fault of the Euro-crats in Brussels, or Germans pulling strings behind the scenes, or the ECB. The politicians tell the voters that self-examination unnecessary and even counterproductive, because they to unite against the malign outsiders.

但在欧元区内，当国家经济不振时，政府会向民众辩解这不是他们的错，罪魁祸首是布鲁塞尔的欧盟官员，或是在背后操纵的德国，或是欧洲央行。政客们会告诉选民，自省没有必要甚至起反作用，因为他们要联合起来抵抗外敌。

Here are some concluding thoughts from Thimann:

下面是Thimann的一些结论性观点： At the core of the economic crisis in the eurozone is the problem of unemployment in several countries. Roughly 18.2 million people are unemployed in early 2015. In about half the eurozone countries, the unemployment rate is below 10 percent, and in Germany it is actually below 5 percent (Eurostat data, February 2015), but in France, 10.7 percent of the labor force are unemployed; in Italy, 12.7 percent; in Portugal, 14.1 percent; in Spain, 23.2 percent; and in Greece, 26.0 percent. ...

欧元区经济危机的核心是一些国家的失业问题。2015年初大约有1820万失业人口。半数欧元国家的失业率在10%以下，德国甚至低于5%（欧盟统计局，2015年2月），但法国有10.7%的劳动人口没有工作，意大利12.7%；葡萄牙14.1%；西班牙23.2%；希腊26%……

It is legitimate to speak about this as a problem for the eurozone in the sense that economic policies in a single currency area are truly a matter of common concern, and also because high unemployment interferes with the smooth functioning of the eurozone, challenging its economic and political cohesion. But it is not accurate to attribute responsibility for the problem, or the solution, to the eurozone as a whole, to European institutions, or to other countries.

我们有理由将此视为一个欧元区问题，因为单一货币区内的经济政策是各国都关注的问题，同时高失业率妨碍欧元区正常运作，挑战其政治和经济凝聚力。但将问题的责任或解决方法归咎于欧元区整体、欧盟机构或其他国家，都是不准确的。

Jobs fail to be created in a number of these countries not because of a “lack of demand” as often claimed, but mainly because wage costs are high relative to productivity, social insurance and tax burdens are heavy, and the business environment is excessively burdensome. All of this should be viewed not in absolute terms,but in relative terms, compared with other economies in Europe and countries around the world where labor costs and productivity are more advantageous, and the business environment is friendlier.

许多国家未能有效创造就业，并不像通常认为的那样是由于“缺乏需求”，主要是因为相对于其生产率水平，工资过高，社会福利和税负过重，商业环境极其不友好。所有这些因素都不能绝对地看，而应相对地看，要和生产成本与生产率更有优势、商业环境更友善的欧洲和全球其他国家放在一起比较研究。

“Europe” is not an all-powerful actor in the field of national economic policies, but only a potentially useful facilitator. Only the country concerned is the legitimate and able party to improve its own economic functioning in line with its social preferences and economic setup. This is why European politics cannot solve the microeconomic dimensions of the eurozone crisis. Within individual countries, it is the governments, administrative authorities, social partners, and all other economic stakeholders that are the legitimate actors in the field of economic and social policies....

“欧洲”在国家层面的经济政策制定上并不是一个有力的参与者，仅有潜在的催化剂作用。只有各相关国家自己才有合法性也有能力依照自身社会偏好和经济结构，设法提高经济运行状况。这就是为什么欧洲政治无法解决欧元区危机微观因素的原因所在。在每一个国家中，经济和社会政策领域中真正有效的参与者是该国的政府，行政机构，社会伙伴和其他经济利益相关者……

For the eurozone countries, their economic and unemployment problems are not primarily a question about some countries versus other countries within the monetary union, but about finding their place in an open global economy—that is, about competing and cooperating successfully with advanced, emerging, and developing economies across the globe.

对欧元区国家，经济和失业问题主要不是货币同盟中国家间的问题，而是能否在开放的全球经济中找到自己的立足点，即成功与全球众多发达、新兴或发展中经济体展开经济合作的问题。

An inward-looking European debate on the distribution of the relative adjustment burden for structural reforms would dramatically overlook the much broader challenges of integration into the global economy. ... It may be more glamorous to focus on European monetary policy, the “European architecture,” or the “bigger macro picture.” But the real issue of—and solution to—the crisis in the eurozone lies in the mostly microeconomic trenches of national economic, social, and structural policies.

关于结构改革带来的重担如何在各国间分配这种纯欧洲内部的争论，会令人极度忽视融入世界经济的挑战……讨论欧洲货币政策，“欧洲铸造者”或“更宏观的图景”等可能显得高大上。但欧元区危机的症结和解决方法所在，主要是国家层面的经济、社会和结构政策的微观经济壕沟。 I think Thimann may understate the fundamental macroeconomic problems that are being created by the presence of the euro (as I've discussed here and here , for example). But he seems to me quite correct to emphasize that many European countries badly need structural, regulatory, and microeconomic adjustments. Moreover, politicians and voters in many of these countries would much rather assail the rest of Europe about international negotiations involving public debt and the euro, rather than face their domestic political issues.

我认为Thimann明白使用欧元带来的基本宏观问题（比如，我在http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2014/02/will-we-look-back-on-euro-as-mistake.html和http://conversableeconomist.blogspot.com/2013/08/a-euro-narrative.html讨论过的）。然而，他所强调的很多欧洲国家急需结构、法规和微观经济调整，在我看来也是合理的。此外，在许多此类国家中，政治家和选民更愿意攻击其他欧洲国家在公共债务和欧元问题国际谈判中的立场，而不是面对本国的政治问题。

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